

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

OCI No. 0631/65

Copy No.

98

MONTHLY REPORT



THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

4 August 1965

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET

SOUTH VIETNAM MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

I. THE SITUATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The short-term prospects of the military government of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu remain precarious. During its two months in office, the government has continued to strike a "revolutionary" public posture and has proceeded to implement some of its announced policies. There are growing indications, however, of differences within the leadership, pressure from student elements, and suspicion among Buddhist leaders. Although there is no serious political challenge or open opposition, the undercurrents of skepticism and criticism are increasing.

2. The efforts of the Ky-Thieu government to mobilize the country's psychological and physical resources and to consolidate the "rear" are still largely in the planning stage. Nonetheless, the government has moved gradually into the serious rice retail market situation, with some favorable economic results. The regime also has raised the pay of enlisted men in the regular and paramilitary services while imposing a 50 percent cut in salaries for top officials, has initiated some programs to improve psychological warfare operations, and has tightened military conscription and police laws. At the same time, major administrative or personnel reorganization has been avoided below the top military and civilian levels of government. The government has also responded to overtures from montagnard elements who went into dissidence following the September 1964 Rhade revolt. Finally, the government has publicly outlined its actions and plans--including the "liberation" of North Vietnam--in a highly nationalistic context obviously intended to raise public morale and transform public apathy into public enthusiasm.

3. Despite these efforts, there does not seem to have been any positive favorable public response. Most people continue to take a "wait-and-see" attitude, somewhat reminiscent of the attentistes during the

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-0472A001800020001-0
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Indochina war period. Some sectors of the population are becoming more critical. For example, while some student elements have been inspired by government appeals to the youth, others continue to resist the idea that students should be obliged to serve in the armed forces. Business interests, particularly among the Chinese minority, have demonstrated growing apprehension over the government's anti-speculation measures, as has the press over recent actions against a number of Saigon newspapers.

Buddhist leader Tri Quang, on occasion propounding the need for national austerity and for a "revolutionary" approach to the problems besetting Vietnam, doubts the government's ability to fulfill its promises. He has criticized many of the government's actions as poorly planned and executed, and has again raised the spectre of an anti-Buddhist conspiracy by Catholic - Can Lao elements allegedly led by Chief of State Thieu. Finally, there are indications of diminishing unity both within the military leadership and between military and civilian officials, partly because of differences about implementing certain programs but partly also because of latent suspicions of personal and political motives.

4. The next month or so may witness serious discontent with the Ky-Thieu leadership unless it is able to move more rapidly from the planning to the action stage. At the same time, however, it will have to move cautiously in accomplishing some of the unpopular austerity measures and, equally important, it must improve its relations with Buddhist and student leaders. In any deteriorating political situation, discord among and between the generals and the civilian officials can be expected to intensify.

Economic Situation

5. The government focused considerable attention on the pressing economic situation. In strong steps against rice speculation, the GVN engaged in distribution activities, set price ceilings, and threatened speculators and black marketeers. This has led at least temporarily to a fairly stable market in Saigon. However, the more fundamental problems of inadequate collection efforts and deliveries from the delta have

- 2 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-0472A001800020001-0
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-00472A001800020001-0
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

not been solved and consequently stocks and anticipated deliveries remain short of projected needs.

The mission has recommended the importation of large amounts of rice (mostly PL 480) to supply Saigon and central Vietnam until the harvest in early 1966, and to rebuild stocks in order to discourage speculation. Despite the relative stability of the Saigon rice market, however, price increases of 21 retail commodities averaged 5.1 percent during the last week of July, bringing the prices of most items beyond their peak levels of June.

6. In another attack on an important economic problem, the GVN and the US mission are negotiating on an agreement for a new market for foreign personnel to exchange dollars for piasters by bringing the effective rate of exchange nearer the current black market rate. This step is designed to combat the active black market which has been growing with Vietnamese inflation and with increases in US forces, and is aggravated by an unrealistic and unenforceable official rate.

7. Airlifts were increasingly used to alleviate the acute transportation problem in central Vietnam. The present daily rice airlift requirement is 132 tons. The use of additional coastal vessels, beginning in early August, will more than double the coastwise transportation capacity and somewhat ease the situation.


8. The Viet Cong continue to impair the economy in various ways. Interdiction of the Da Nhim transmission line has caused a serious power shortage in the Saigon/Cholon area, and no immediate relief seems in sight. Exports of rubber, South Vietnam's leading export commodity, will probably fall this year as a result of increasing military activity near plantations and transportation difficulties.

9. Early in July, Presidential envoy Eugene Black and his party consulted with GVN officials and the US mission on Vietnam's economic problems.

- 3 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-00472A001800020001-0
SECRET



~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. The intensity of the Viet Cong (VC) summer campaign, which started in late May and steadily gained momentum in June, appeared to reach a peak early in July. It was followed by a gradual decline and a return by the end of the month to the familiar pattern of terrorism, small-scale attacks, and sabotage.

In contrast to this downward shift in intensity, however, has been the increase in VC activities around US installations. MACV has frequently reported sightings of VC south of Da Nang, near Phu Bai, and in the vicinity of Chu Lai airfield. A considerable part of Viet Cong activity around these installations probably involves intelligence collection but there are also reports of large concentrations in nearby areas. There has also been some sporadic shelling in the vicinity of Da Nang and Chu Lai, but not to the extent experienced in mid-July at Bien Hoa where elements of the 1st Division underwent harassment on four consecutive nights. At the same time several outposts close to Saigon, in some instances within 3-4 miles, were attacked and overrun.

2. Military developments during July suggests a possible regrouping of VC forces for renewed large-scale actions. Viet Cong tactical operations, especially against and in the vicinity of US bases, appear to be probing actions designed to test and evaluate US reactions.

Although the momentum of the VC offensive slowed from mid-July on, the total number of Communist-initiated incidents in July--about 2,500--was approximately the same as in June. Efforts to interdict lines of communications still held high priority although incidents of sabotage dropped from 450 to 401. Only six of the 46 armed attacks recorded were of battalion-size, with the remainder involving elements estimated to be no larger than company-size or smaller.

In the critical central highlands region, the enemy continued its campaign to isolate this

- 4 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

area by making routes 7, 14, and 20 impassable to civilian and military traffic. The reopening of Route 19, following extensive clearing operations, permitting the transport of over 2,700 tons of supplies and equipment to Pleiku City. Some troops have since been withdrawn from the force protecting this route, thus increasing its vulnerability to VC interdiction. The flow of refugees from this area continues, partly in anticipation of renewed VC attacks. There has been a recent increase in the accepted Viet Cong OB in the area and there are reports of troop movements which could foreshadow such attacks.

By the end of July, US advisors evaluated only one regiment as combat ineffective. In addition to this regiment, 13 battalions were rated combat ineffective, including three ranger, nine infantry, and one airborne.

3. Since the beginning period of the monsoon in mid-May, some 7,102 VC and 2,957 government troops have been killed; 958 VC were captured and 3,331 defected to the government. Government troops missing in action during the period totaled 2,539. The KIA ratio during the period was 2.3:1, which is slightly above average. The weapons lost ratio during the same period favored the VC at 2.7:1, which is about normal.

4. The initiative and momentum of military operations continue to depend more upon the VC than upon the GVN. There is no real improvement in the overall military situation, despite the decrease in VC activity and the shift from a major offensive posture toward small-scale attacks, sabotage, terrorism, harassment and interdiction. The impact of VC operations is being felt not only by the RVNAF but by the nation's internal economy as well. Pressure against pockets of government influence and lines of communications is expected to be maintained and may well increase in conjunction with larger scale attacks. As the build-up of US forces progresses, VC probes to test and evaluate US reactions will continue. Until the VC are ready to launch another offensive, they can be expected to avoid being drawn into major engagements with RVNAF regular and US combat elements.

- 5 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
SECRET

C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION

1. Rural Reconstruction throughout the country failed to show any significant progress in June. The continued deterioration of security in I and II Corps zones has virtually precluded any major expansion of the program in these areas. In III Corps zone, only limited gains have been made in the high-priority Hop Tac area. The major effort there apparently has been concentrated on the population and resources control program. A resurgence of Viet Cong activity occurred in the southern part of the area at the end of July. IV Corps has not reported any significant rural reconstruction activity. Reporting on rural reconstruction activities, especially the number of New Life Hamlets being "completed," has not been available from the field on a current basis for some time. Reports dealing with area control and hamlets completed usually arrive four to six weeks after the reporting period.

2. The number of persons returning to government control under the Chieu Hoi program during July dropped sharply in comparison to June. In July, a total of 1,854 individuals were reported to have defected from the Viet Cong, included were 866 military defectors and 205 political cadres, while the rest were largely civilian returnees with a sprinkling of draft dodgers. In June, returnees numbered 5,482 with 748 military and 236 political cadres. The drop in the total number of Chieu Hoi returnees possibly may represent a slow-down by field workers because of the government's failure to form either a Chieu Hoi organization or policy at the national level.

3. Government efforts in the psychological warfare effort continued at a high level in July, but without any noticeable significant results.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

High altitude photography this month disclosed the presence of three additional surface-to-air (SAM) sites in the DRV--numbers five, six and seven. The fifth site, located ten nautical miles northwest of Hanoi, is part of the ring of SAM sites surrounding the DRV capital. Numbers six and seven are located 30 nautical miles west north-west of Hanoi. All are apparently in the final stages of construction or may already be completed.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Intervention Threats

Vietnamese propaganda continued during the month to sharpen the threat to bring in foreign volunteers, but stopped short of an open admission that some are now participating in the fighting. In South Vietnam, the Liberation Front reiterated its 9 June threat to call on "the armies of North Vietnam and friendly socialist countries to volunteer to go to South Vietnam" if the US continued its military buildup. Front president Nguyen Huu Tho on 20 July claimed that "socialist" countries "are now ready to support or are actually supporting us in all fields including weapons and volunteers."

DRV army chief General Vo Nguyen Giap has discussed circumstances under which direct foreign participation might become necessary. Writing in the July issue of the party theoretical journal, Hoc Tap, Giap warned his people to make every preparation for a possible ground attack on the DRV in view of the increased American commitment in the South. In such an event, he added, the "whole socialist camp" would come to the aid of Hanoi.

This added emphasis on foreign participation may reflect, in part, the outcome of the swing through bloc capitals by DRV Deputy Premier Le Thang Nghi during the month. In the course of his six week trip, Nghi negotiated new aid agreements with many of the bloc states. The language of the joint communique signed by the delegation in Peiping on 17 July took

note of the "enormous support" and "steadfast" assistance already received from China, while the agreement signed by the delegation in Moscow the previous week noted only that "cordial conversations" were held in a "spirit of complete understanding." Both aid agreements were in part aimed at improving North Vietnamese military defense capabilities.

Strong Chinese propaganda attacks on the nature of Soviet support for the DRV continued during the month. A People's Daily article on 31 July accused the Soviets of being in league with the Americans to promote peace talks and maintained that Soviet apprehension over the possible enlargement of the Vietnamese conflict was merely a device to "scare the North Vietnamese people away from supporting the struggle in the South." The Chinese representative at the World Congress Against the Use of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs also took the Soviets to task. He contrasted the Soviet aims, which he said were directed "at deceiving the Vietnamese people into stopping their struggle for liberation," with Chinese determination to give the Vietnamese people "every possible aid whatever the cost."

2. Negotiations

Hanoi's resolve to see the Vietnam conflict settled on Communist terms was reaffirmed this month in rejection by the DRV of several peace initiatives and proposals.

In late June, Hanoi rejected the proposals of the Commonwealth Peace Mission initiated by Prime Minister Wilson. Hanoi's distaste with the mission was reflected in the treatment given British Parliamentarian Harold Davies who spent an unsuccessful six days in Hanoi in early July attempting "to try to get a dialogue started" on negotiations. Hanoi made it plain that it was not receiving Davies as a representative of the Commonwealth mission and allowed him to meet only with representatives of the Fatherland Front, a DRV mass propaganda organization.

The DRV was, however, extremely careful to disassociate the African members of the mission from its attacks on the Commonwealth proposals. The DRV representative in Moscow approached his Nigerian and Ghanaian counterparts and indicated that Hanoi would be happy to receive the Nigerian prime minister or the Ghanaian president, if they did not come as representatives of the Commonwealth mission.

On 20 July, President Nkrumah of Ghana sent his personal representative, Ambassador Kwesi Armah, to Hanoi with a letter to Ho Chi Minh. Armah was accorded a much better reception than Davies and talked with a number of high level Vietnamese leaders. During his discussions, the Vietnamese repeated their standard proposals for a settlement of the war. Armah left Hanoi on the 30th bearing a letter to Nkrumah from Ho and reportedly was encouraged by his meeting.

While the Armah mission was on its way back to Africa, Hanoi denounced the Tito-Shastri talks on a peace settlement in Vietnam even before the full text of the discussions had been published. A party daily editorial on 1 August stated that the two participants had "wholeheartedly advertised and peddled Johnson's unconditional discussion merchandise" and were nothing but "errand boys" of US policy in Vietnam. As if to complete its rejection of any avenue of approach to negotiation, both Peiping and Hanoi raised objections to the use of the UN in any sort of a mediation effort in Vietnam. Hanoi, in a party daily editorial, asserted that the UN has no right to intervene in Vietnam, but on the contrary ought to compel the US Government to put an end to the war.

DRV president Ho Chi Minh used the 20 July anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements to reiterate that his nation would fight till final victory even if it had to go on fighting "twenty years, or even longer." Ho's appeal stated that if the US wished a peaceful solution to the war, it must implement the Geneva agreements,

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

and carry out the DRV's well known "four points." Peiping and the Liberation Front echoed Ho's appeal by urging greater efforts from Viet Cong forces and demanding a settlement on Communist terms.

The announcement on 28 July of an increased US commitment in the Vietnamese war prompted a heavy propaganda response from Hanoi and the clandestine Liberation Radio. A DRV Government statement on 3 August summed up the Vietnamese Communist position. "For the US Government" it stated, "there is only one way to an honorable peace--that is to implement the Geneva agreements and accept the stand of the DRV. "There is no other way, not even the resort to UN intervention." Chinese reaction to the statement adopted the same defiant position as Hanoi.

- 10 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0

SECRET

III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

A. GVN CONDITIONS FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION

In an exclusive interview of 3 July to Vietnam Press, the semi-official government press agency, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do again expounded the GVN conditions for settling the Vietnam conflict. Referring to his speech in June in which he spelled out the GVN's "Four Points" for a political settlement, Do reiterated the GVN position that withdrawal of foreign troops cannot be envisaged until Communist troops and cadres had been withdrawn from South Vietnam and the ensuing peace properly guaranteed. Do also repeated that the GVN sought peace in freedom and dignity, but not peace at any price. He again rejected possible negotiations with the Viet Cong, stating that this would be tantamount to recognizing rebellion and subversion, to rewarding armed aggression, and to permitting Communists to play the role of the Trojan Horse.

B. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION

Significant diplomatic assignments were made during the past month. Pham Dang Lam, the new South Vietnamese ambassador to the Philippines, presented his credentials to President Macapagal on 28 July. (Lam served as Foreign Minister from November 1963 to February 1964 in the Minh-Tho government.) Pham Trong Nhan, the newly appointed GVN ambassador to Laos, arrived in Vientiane on 23 July. Agreement was received from Japan for the assignment of Nguyen Duy Quang to serve as Vietnamese ambassador in Tokyo. The GVN is reportedly recalling Major General Thai Quang Hoang, who had served as ambassador to Thailand since 19 March 1964. Hoang Thuc Dam, former GVN protocol chief, informed the US Embassy that he would be going to Morocco as ambassador "soon."

C. FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE

1. Australia

The 1st Royal Australian Regiment, consisting of over 900 combat troops, has joined the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in operations.

- 11 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

2. New Zealand

All of the 123-man New Zealand 161st Artillery Battery, which will work in cooperation with Australian forces in South Vietnam, arrived at Bien Hoa by 21 July. Twenty-five New Zealand engineers, who had been engaged primarily in construction work in South Vietnam, were withdrawn.

3. Philippines

President Macapagal did not recertify the administration's bill for aid to South Vietnam to the special session of the Philippine Congress which adjourned on July 12. In a conversation with Ambassador Blair, Macapagal indicated that if he won the 9 November elections he would call a special congressional session in mid-November and recertify the bill.

4. Republic of Korea

A bill requesting approval of the ROK's plan to dispatch an army combat division and a Marine regimental combat team to South Vietnam was sent to the National Assembly and referred to the National Defense Committee on 14 July.

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET

ANNEX

Viet Cong Tactics and Objectives in Attacks
on District and Provincial Capitals

1. Ambushing the destroying South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) reaction forces, thereby weakening ARVN's local and general reserve capabilities, are usually the main objectives of Viet Cong attacks on district and provincial capitals. However, in a number of instances, such attacks have resulted in district towns being abandoned by the government.

2. In at least two recent large attacks, the Viet Cong were driven off, but there are indications that they had made contingency plans to hold and administer the towns. Whether or not the Viet Cong actually expected to succeed in this regard and whether such planning reflects an actual change in their past policy, the net effect of these attacks has been to disrupt government machinery and terrify the populace into cooperation with the Communists.

Tactics and Objectives

3. Certain recent attacks on district or provincial towns, provide an opportunity to assess Viet Cong activity while in control of the town. The instances are the regimental- and battalion-sized Viet Cong attacks in May and June against Song Be, capital of Phuoc Long Province; Dong Xoai, a district town in Phuoc Long; and Le Thanh, a district town in Pleiku Province.

4. Attacks of this magnitude are very carefully planned by the Viet Cong. The local Viet Cong infrastructure provides detailed intelligence on the intended target. A special reconnaissance company of the main force assault unit usually tries to confirm the information already collected and to draw up an initial battle concept. The detailed attack plan is made by the main force unit's staff. Usually a full dress rehearsal will be conducted in a VC safe area. Shortly before the attack, the local guerrillas will "prepare" the battlefield; set up ambush sites, construct defensive positions,

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

accumulate supplies, and guard the approaches to the battlefield. Throughout this preparatory phase great stress is laid on preserving secrecy and masking VC tactical plans.

5. The political objective of the attacks generally is to disrupt or weaken the GVN's administrative apparatus and further lessen the population's confidence in the GVN's ability to protect them. Political preparations in the target area are more difficult to assess and have been usually confined to propaganda activities. These consist mostly of threats to capture the town, "liberate" the inhabitants and punish "bad elements," i.e., loyal GVN officials. In the assaults in Phuoc Long Province on Song Be and Dong Xoai, the VC apparently made contingency plans to use and administer the province and district capitals if the GVN failed to recapture them. This conclusion is based on several captured VC documents containing plans for the NFLSVN to set up provincial "governments" after control of a province has been seized. Certain actions during and after the attacks on Song Be and Dong Xoai lend credence to this conclusion.

Song Be

6. Several hours prior to the assault on the administrative compound at Song Be, a number of VC infiltrated the town and announced their presence to the population. The VC stated that they intended to liberate the town and the province, and asked the population to "assist" them in driving out the GVN. The exact form that this assistance was to take is not clear. The VC did not have time properly to organize the people. The population did not actively cooperate with the VC, but neither did they warn the government forces at Song Be of the VC's presence or of the imminence of an assault.

7. At Song Be the VC made some attempt to spare the population from battle hazards. In addition to the reassuring and confident tones of the propaganda immediately before the battle, the people were allowed to flee the town once the fighting began. The only confiscations were of

- 2 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-01800020001-0
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

rice, for which receipts were issued. Some looting occurred on an individual basis. Civilian casualties were relatively light. The actions suggested that the VC had hoped to capture the administrative seat, and were concerned also about possibly alienating the population they expected to administer.

8. The VC suffered a tactical setback, however, at Song Be. Their approach then changed from one of trying to win over the populace to one of terrifying them into cooperating after the battle. Loudspeaker propaganda directed at the town took the form of dire threats against the town and its "wicked elements." The threats, coupled with the destruction wrought in the battle, caused a moderate panic among the population and resulted in a heavy exodus of refugees, imposing further burdens on the shaken GVN local administration. In addition, some stay-behind elements in the town contributed to the confusion. How many agents were left and what their relation was to the already existing VC infrastructure in the Song Be area is not clear.

Dong Xoai

9. The attack on the nearby district town of Dong Xoai one month later came without any local warning. There were no overt atrocities committed on the population, there was also no attempt to shield them from the battle, and they were not allowed to flee the town as in Song Be. Consequently, US-GVN operations to retake the town caused many civilian casualties. It is not known if any stay-behind elements were left in Dong Xoai.

Le Thanh

10. In Le Thanh in Pleiku Province, the VC made no attempt to hold the town once it had been overrun. The immediate object apparently was to destroy the administrative seat and any GVN forces reacting to the initial VC assault. The Communists succeeded in gaining both objectives. When government forces finally did re-enter the town, it was because they were unopposed. VC propaganda activities in the town were minimal; force withdrew almost immediately after the military objectives were accomplished. The population was not oppressed, except

- 3 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP80-01800020001-0
~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

for some forced contributions of rice and other foodstuffs. There is no information available on stay-behind elements in Le Thanh, since the GVN subsequently abandoned the town to the VC.

Disruptive Effects

11. In both Song Be and Dong Xoai, the VC were not in control of the town long enough to implement any administrative plans they might have had. Neither was there time for propaganda programs once the fighting actually began. US-GVN tactical actions forced them to abandon the sections of the town they held.

12. In neither of these two cases were the VC able to hold the town for any length of time, but the size of the attack and the ferocity of the fighting led to a large exodus of refugees from Phuoc Long Province. The remaining population now is much more submissive to the VC than they were previously. Despite heavy losses in these attacks, VC military strength in Phuoc Long Province remains high, and the confidence of the people in the GVN has been severely shaken. The VC therefore remain in a position to renew their attempts to extend their control over the population and administrative centers of the province.

13. Previously no efforts were known to have been made to hold or administer a town that had been overrun, but the VC may now have changed their policy. Certain district towns which were recently overrun or abandoned (Tou Morong, in Kontum Province; Le Thanh in Pleiku; An Lao in Binh Dinh; and Phu Tuc in Phu Bon) are apparently being administered by the VC. In cases where they failed to hold the town (Song Be and Dong Xoai in Phuoc Long Province), they succeeded in disrupting the GVN machinery and in terrifying the populace into at least clandestine cooperation while maintaining a military threat against the district seats.

- 4 -

BACKGROUND USE ONLY


Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-00472A001800020001-0
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965


WEEKLY REPORT

SECRET


PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)



WEAPONS LOSSES



VIET CONG ACTIVITIES




SECRET

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

SECRET PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)




* WOUNDED NOT INCLUDED. VIET CONG FIGURES UNAVAILABLE.

SECRET

SECRET
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT

WEAPONS LOSSES - VIETNAM and VIET CONG




SECRET

SECRET

SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT

INCIDENTS - VIET CONG



South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
 Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 July 1965

1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	211	116	391	890	1396	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	688	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	205	1327	2016	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1480	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1870	1650	-	232	529	2473	2399	757	973
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	256	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	2223	2143	-	873	548	4065	2781	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	416	77	441	1015	2523	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1862	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	934	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2269	1046	2602	1575	-	540	406	3161	3008	1132	831
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Time Period		Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
			GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2583	607	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2755	-	-
	1963	1882	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666

Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4237	1270	5701	12882	30896	5195	4049*
1963	17813	5665	20574	11488	3462	3137	4290	20290	28385	8267	5397
1964	28526	7477	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	15233	6432	14692	12699	-	5490	2940	24621	17642	11573	5457

*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

-S2-

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 26 June 1965

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Co. Size	Total	Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size							
1962	1826	528	--	--	--	549	839	180	257	--
Jan 1963	927	242	2	2	8	252	447	49	179	--
1964	1770	218	3	3	2	223	1244	129	174	--
1965	2206	57	1	1	5	63	1489	272	170	212
1962	1460	480	--	--	--	500	613	137	210	--
Feb 1963	788	181	1	1	13	195	433	69	91	--
1964	2078	211	3	3	3	217	1389	201	271	--
1965	1982	73	3	3	6	82	1411	267	91	131
1962	1961	561	--	--	--	588	660	290	423	--
Mar 1963	1282	333	0	0	11	344	653	131	154	--
1964	2160	198	1	1	4	203	1632	158	167	--
1965	2056	80	3	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
1962	1933	470	--	--	--	497	1024	220	192	--
Apr 1963	1331	371	3	3	9	383	688	105	155	--
1964	2284	211	3	3	6	220	1738	169	157	--
1965	1860	38	4	4	1	43	1407	149	96	165
1962	1825	490	--	--	--	528	892	154	251	--
May 1963	1208	344	0	0	13	357	608	93	150	--
1964	2143	170	2	2	3	175	1418	217	140	193
1965	2263	40	11	11	7	58	1555	365	115	170
1962	1477	385	1	1	21	407	736	157	222	--
Jun 1963	1311	398	1	1	11	410	652	107	142	--
1964	2062	128	2	2	10	140	1390	176	162	194
1965	2597	62	6	6	1	69	1784	469	103	172
1962	1564	437	1	1	10	448	735	158	223	--
Jul 1963	1368	398	1	1	8	407	698	80	183	--
1964	3045	166	12	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
1965	2269	37	6	6	0	43	1526	361	139	200
1962	1642	368	0	0	9	377	885	146	233	--
Aug 1963	1349	356	1	1	11	368	647	113	221	--
1964	2580	107	3	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S			Terrorism	Sabotage	Propaganda	Anti-Aircraft
		Small-Scale	BN. Size	Co. Size				
1962	1375	382	0	9	624	178	182	--
Sep 1963	1763	483	3	17	889	164	207	--
1964	3091	110	4	4	1938	482	178	375
1962	1357	406	1	12	583	189	166	--
Oct 1963	1422	363	0	6	802	105	150	--
1964	2827	75	6	2	1790	480	197	277
1962	1311	411	3	7	614	144	132	--
Nov 1963	3182	631	3	11	1990	269	278	--
1964	1982	57	1	2	1391	247	109	175
1962	1346	375	1	8	670	107	185	--
Dec 1963	1882	258	0	3	1228	111	251	--
1964	2504	81	6	9	1719	318	128	243
Composite Annual Totals								
1962	19,076	5295	41	173	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17,813	4358	15	121	9735	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28,526	1732	46	55	18656	3178	2080	1879
1965	15,233	387	34	23	10648	2123	804	1214

Through 31 July 1965

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0

-S4-

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800020001-0